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Abstract
In this note we investigate stochastic Nash equilibrium problems by means of
monotone variational inequalities in probabilistic Lebesgue spaces. We apply our
approach to a class of oligopolistic market equilibrium problems where the data
are known through their probability distributions.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we deal with stochastic Nash equilibrum problems (SNEPs) which we
analyze using the powerful tool of stochastic variational inequalities (SVIs). As an
important application of the considered SNEP model, we investigate the oligopolistic
market equilibria with uncertain data. In the present contribution, our objective is
to establish a connection between general SNEPs and SVIs and propose a model of
oligopolistic markets where the cost functions are not necessarily quadratic and the
demand price is not restricted to be linear.
We emphasize that in the deterministic framework, it is well known that oligopolis-
tic market equilibria are particular cases of Nash equilibria and that Nash equilibrium
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problems are equivalent to variational inequality problems under suitable differen-
tiability hypotheses (see [1] for the infinite-dimensional case, and [14] for a finite-
dimensional setting). Recently, some authors used a Lebesgue space formulation of
oligopoly models to introduce time-dependent data ( [2–4]). We consider SNEPs where
the data are affected by a certain degree of uncertainty here, for example the case that
the data are known by their probabilistic measures only. To provide a theoretical jus-
tification, we provide a formulation of SNEPs in Lebesgue spaces with probability
measure, and then derive the associated SVIs. This mechanism allows us to exploit the
recently developed tools of theory of stochastic variational inequalities in Lebesgue
spaces (see e.g. [16–19]). We remark that in recent years many researchers devoted
their efforts to SVIs and SNEPs [6, 7, 11, 15, 22, 27, 28, 30–32, 34]. However, these
approaches differ from ours. They rely on defining a deterministic representative of the
original stochastic variational inequality, and then use sample-average approximation
techniques to get an estimate of the solution. In our previous work [21] we have done
a comparative study to analyze different approaches for a traffic equilibrum problem,
and the work illustrated different solution concepts and numerical methods.
This work is organized in 7 sections. In Section 2 we formulate the Nash equi-
librium problem in a Lebesgue space with probability measure, and derive its equiv-
alent stochastic variational inequality under suitable hypotheses. In Sections 3 and 4
we recall some theoretical results from [17, 19] together with a description of the ap-
proximation procedure used for the solution of the stochastic variational inequality. In
Section 5 we propose a model of Cournot oligopoly with uncertain data and discuss the
hypotheses needed to exploit the theory of stochastic variational inequalities. Section 6
is devoted to numerical examples: we introduce a stochastic version of a class of utility
functions widely used in the literature which yield to nonlinear monotone stochastic
variational inequalities. The final section contains summary of results and an outline
of future research directions.
2 Stochastic Nash games and variational inequalities
Let (Ω,A ,P) be a probability space and consider a noncooperative game with m play-
ers each acting in a selfish manner in order to maximize their individual welfare. For
P− almost every ω , each player i has a strategy vector qi = (qi1, . . . ,qin) ∈ Xi(ω),
where Xi(ω)⊂ Rn is a convex and closed set, and a utility (or welfare) function
wi : Ω×X1(ω)×X2(ω)× . . .×Xm(ω)→ R.
He/she choses his/her strategy vector qi so as to maximize wi, given the moves (q j) j 6=i
of the other players. We will use the notation
q−i = (q1, . . . ,qi−1,qi+1, . . . ,qm), q = (qi,q−i).
Definition 2.1 A stochastic Nash equilibrium is a random vector q∗(ω)= (q∗1(ω), . . . ,q∗m(ω))∈
X(ω) = X1(ω)×X2(ω)× . . .×Xm(ω), such that P− a.s. (almost surely):
wi(ω ,q∗i (ω),q
∗
−i)≥ wi(ω ,qi,q
∗
−i(ω)), ∀qi ∈ Xi(ω),∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. (1)
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The following theorem relates Nash equilibrium problems and variational inequal-
ities. For its proof it suffices to apply the classical finite-dimensional proof, for each
fixed value of the random parameter ω .
Theorem 2.1 Let wi(ω , ·) ∈C1(Rmn),∀i, and concave with respect to qi. Let F : Ω×
R
mn → Rmn be the mapping built with the partial gradients of the utility functions as
follows:
F(ω ,q) = (−∇q1w1(ω ,q), . . . ,−∇qmwm(ω ,q)).
Then, q∗(ω) ∈ X(ω) is a stochastic Nash equilibrium if and only if, P−a.s., it satisfies
the variational inequality:
F(ω ,q∗(ω)) · (q− q∗(ω)) =
m
∑
r=1
−∇qr wr(ω ,q∗(ω)) · (qr− q∗r(ω))≥ 0,∀q ∈ X(ω).
(2)
Problems (1) and (2) are parametric versions of the deterministic problems, where the
random parameter ω belongs to the given sample space Ω. A solution q∗(ω) of these
problems is a random vector. From a statistical point of view it is important that q∗(ω)
has finite first and second moments. As a consequence, we introduce integral versions
of (1) and (2).
Thus, let p ≥ 2, ∀i define the set:
Ki = {v ∈ Lp(Ω,P,Rn) : v(ω) ∈ Xi(ω),P− a.s.}
and consider the problem of finding u∗ ∈ Lp(Ω,P,Rmn) such that ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} one
has: ∫
Ω
wi(ω ,u
∗(ω))dPω = max
ui∈Ki
∫
Ω
wi(ω ,ui(ω),u
∗
−i(ω))dPω . (3)
The associated variational inequality problem is the following:
Find u∗ ∈ KP:∫
Ω
m
∑
r=1
−∇qr wr(ω ,u∗(ω)) · (ur(ω)− u∗r (ω))dPω ≥ 0 ∀u ∈ KP (4)
where
KP = K1 ×·· ·×Km.
In (3) we have introduced, ∀i, the functional Ji : Lp(Ω,P,Rmn)→R through:
Ji(u1, . . . ,um) =
∫
Ω
wi((ω),u1(ω), . . . ,um(ω))dPω (5)
In order that this functional be well defined and to work with (3) and (4), we shall
impose a set of assumptions on the functions wi, namely:
(a) For all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, wi(·,q) be a random variable with respect to the sigma-
algebra defined on Ω, ∀q, and wi(ω , ·) ∈C1(Rmn) P-a.s.
(b) For all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, wi(ω ,0) ∈ L1(Ω,P).
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(c) For all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, wi(ω ,q) be concave with respect to qi, P− a.s., for all
fixed values of q−i.
(d) For all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, |∇qwi(ω ,q)| ≤ α(ω)+βi(ω)|q|p−1, where βi ∈ L∞(Ω,P)
and α ∈ Lp′(Ω,P), p′ = p/p− 1.
We are now in a position to prove a simple lemma which is fundamental for the sequel.
Theorem 2.2 Let assumptions a)-d) be fulfilled. Then, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} the func-
tional Ji(u) = Ji(ui,u−i) is well defined on Lp(Ω,P,Rmn) and concave with respect to
the variable ui ∈ Lp(Ω,P,Rn) for each fixed u−i. Moreover Ji is Gateaux-differentiable
with respect to ui, for each u−i and its derivative is given by:
DiJi(ui,u−i)(vi) =
∫
Ω
∇qiwi(ω ,ui,u−i) · vi(ω)dPω = (6)
∫
Ω
n
∑
r=1
( ∂
∂qr
(wi(ω ,u(ω))
)
vir(ω)dPω , ∀vi = (vi1, . . . ,vin) ∈ Lp(Ω,P,Rn)
Proof. First, we show that the functional Ji is well defined for all i. Thus, for P-almost
every ω ∈ Ω apply Lagrange Theorem to the function wi(ω ,q), with respect to the
interval of endpoints 0,q. We get that ∃ξ ∈ Rmn, |ξ |< |q| such that:
|wi(ω ,q)| ≤ |wi(ω ,0)|+ |∇qwi(ω ,ξ )||q| ≤ |wi(ω ,0)|+ |α(ω)||q|+βi(ω)|ξ |p−1|q|.
Then, ∀u ∈ Lp(Ω,P,Rmn) we get
|wi(ω ,u(ω))| ≤ |wi(ω ,0)|+ |α(ω)||u(ω)|p−1+βi(ω)|u(ω)|
which shows that wi(ω ,u(ω)) belongs to L1(Ω,P), hence Ji is well defined. The con-
cavity of Ji(ui,u−i) with respect to ui is a straightforward consequence of the analogous
property di wi(ω ,q).
In order to prove that Ji is Gateaux-differentiable with respect to ui, for each fixed u−i
, fix a point ui, a direction vi and for each t ∈]0,1[ consider the quotient:
Ji(ui + tvi,u−i)− Ji(ui,u−i)
t
=
∫
Ω
1
t
[wi(ω ,ui(ω)+ tvi(ω),u−i(ω))−wi(ω ,ui(ω),u−i(ω))]dPω
=
∫
Ω
∇qiwi(ω ,ui(ω)+ th(ω)vi(ω),u−i(ω)) · vi(ω)dPω ,
where h : Ω→ [0,1] is a random variable. We obtain (6) because it is possible to pass to
the limit under the integral sign for t → 0. Indeed, since wi(ω , ·) has continuous partial
derivatives, it follows that for t → 0, we get, P− a.s.:
∇qiwi(ω ,ui(ω)+ th(ω)vi(ω),u−i(ω)) · vi(ω)−→ ∇qiwi(ω ,ui(ω),u−i(ω)) · vi(ω),
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moreover
|∇qiwi(ω ,ui(ω)+ th(ω)vi(ω),u−i(ω)) · vi(ω)|
≤ |α(ω)||vi(ω)|+βi(ω) ( |ui(ω)|+ |vi(ω)|+ |u−i(ω)|)p−1 .
At last, the fact that DiJi(u)(·) is a linear and continuous functional on Lp(Ω,P,Rn)
concludes the proof. 
Once we have established the expression of the Gateaux derivative of Ji, consider, for
each u, the operator Γ(u) : Lp(Ω,P,Rmn)→ Lp′(Ω,P,Rmn) defined by:
Γ(u) = (−D1J1(u), . . . ,−DmJm(u)).
Then, from the infinite dimensional theory of Nash equilibrium problems, we get (see
e.g. [1]) that (3) is equivalent to
u∗ ∈ KP : Γ(u∗)(u− u∗)≥ 0, ∀u ∈ KP,
which is nothing other than (4).
3 Stochastic variational inequalities in Lebesgue spaces
In the sequel we shall study SNEPs and, in particular, the oligopolistic market, through
its equivalent variational inequality (4). As mentioned in the introduction, variational
inequalities of this kind have been introduced quite recently and in this section we
recall the main results useful for our application. A more comprehensive treatement
can be found in [17–19]. In particular, we shall treat the case where the deterministic
and random variable are separated and in this case an approximation procedure for the
computation of the solution is presented.
Let (Ω,A ,P) be a probability space. Let G,H : Rk → Rk be two given maps, let
b,c ∈Rk be fixed vectors, and let R and S be two real-valued random variables defined
on Ω. Let λ be a random vector in Rk, let D be random vector in Rm, and let A ∈Rm×k
be a given matrix. For ω ∈ Ω, we define a random set
M(ω) := {x ∈Rk : Ax ≤ D(ω)}.
Consider the following stochastic variational inequality: For almost all ω ∈ Ω, find
xˆ := xˆ(ω) ∈ M(ω) such that
〈S(ω)G(xˆ)+H(xˆ),z− xˆ〉 ≥ 〈R(ω)c+ b,z− xˆ〉, for every z ∈ M(ω). (7)
Variational inequality (7) holds pointwise on Ω, except a fixed null set depending on
the solution xˆ. To facilitate the foregoing discussion, we set
F(ω ,x) := S(ω)G(x)+H(x),
Let S,G and H be such that F : Ω×Rk 7→ Rk is a Carathe´odory function. That is, for
each fixed x∈Rk, the function F(·,x) is measurable with respect to A whereas for each
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ω ∈ Ω the function F(ω , ·) is continuous. We also assume that F(ω , ·) is monotone
for every ω ∈ Ω:
〈F(ω ,x)−F(ω ,y),x− y〉 ≥ 0, ∀x,y,∀ω
If the equality sign holds only for x = y, then F is said strictly monotone and, in this
case there is at most a solution to (7) which, under suitable conditions belongs to an Lp
space for some p ≥ 2.
A stronger form of monotonicity will be useful in the sequel:
Definition 3.1 F is strongly monotone, uniformly with respect to ω iff ∃a > 0:
〈F(ω ,x)−F(ω ,y),x− y〉 ≥ a‖x− y‖2, ∀x,y,∀ω .
For this, we proceed to derive the integral formulation of (7). For a fixed p ≥ 2, we
define the reflexive Banach space Lp(Ω,P,Rk) of random vectors V from Ω to Rk such
that the expectation (p-moment) is given by:
EP‖V‖p =
∫
Ω
‖V (ω)‖pdP(ω)< ∞.
For the subsequent development, we need the following growth condition
‖F(ω ,z)‖ ≤ α(ω)+β (ω)‖z‖p−1, ∀z ∈ Rk, for some p ≥ 2, (8)
where α ∈ Lp′(Ω,P) and β ∈ L∞(Ω,P).
Due to the above growth condition, the Nemitsky operator ˆF associated to F , acts
from Lp(Ω,P,Rk) to Lp′(Ω,P,Rk), where p−1 + p′−1 = 1. Furthermore, we have
ˆF(V )(ω) := F(ω ,V (ω)), ω ∈ Ω.
Assuming D ∈ Lpm(Ω) := Lp(Ω,P,Rm), we introduce the following nonempty, closed
and convex subset of Lpk (Ω)
MP := {V ∈ Lpk (Ω) : AV (ω)≤ D(ω), P− a.s.},
which is the Lp analogue of M(ω) defined above.
Let S(ω) ∈ L∞, 0 < s < S(ω)< s, and R(ω) ∈ Lp′ . Equipped with these notation,
we consider the following Lp formulation of (7). Find ˆU ∈ MP such that for every
V ∈ MP, we have∫
Ω
〈S(ω)G( ˆU(ω))+H( ˆU(ω)),V (ω)− ˆU(ω)〉dP(ω)≥
∫
Ω
〈b+R(ω)c,V(ω)− ˆU(ω)〉dP(ω).
(9)
To get rid of the abstract sample space Ω, we consider the joint distribution P of the
random vector (R,S,D) and work with the special probability space (Rd ,B(Rd),P),
where the dimension d := 2+m. For simplicity, we assume that R, S and D are inde-
pendent random vectors. We set
r = R(ω),
s = S(ω),
t = D(ω),
y = (r,s, t).
6
For each y ∈Rd , we define the set
M(y) := {x ∈ Rk : Ax ≤ t}.
The pointwise formulation of the variational inequality reads: Find xˆ such that xˆ(y) ∈
M(y), P - a.s., and the following inequality holds for P - almost every y ∈ Rd and for
every x ∈ M(y), we have
〈sG(xˆ(y))+H(xˆ(y)),x− xˆ(y)〉 ≥ 〈rc+ b,x− xˆ(y)〉 . (10)
In order to obtain the integral formulation of (10), consider the space Lp(Rd ,P,Rk)
and introduce the closed and convex set
MP := {v ∈ Lp(Rd ,P,Rk) : Av(r,s, t)≤ t, P− a.s.}.
With this terminology, we consider the variational inequality of finding uˆ ∈ MP such
that for every v ∈ MP we have
∞∫
0
s∫
s
∫
Rd
〈sG(uˆ(y))+H(uˆ(y)),v(y)− uˆ(y)〉dP(y)≥
∞∫
0
s∫
s
∫
Rd
〈b+ r c,v(y)− uˆ(y)〉dP(y).
(11)
Remark 3.1 Our approach and analysis extends readily to more general finite Karhunen-
Loe`ve expansions
λ (ω) = b+
L
∑
l=1
Rl(ω) cl , F(ω ,x) = H(x)+
LF∑
l=1
Sl(ω)Gl(x).
4 An Approximation Procedure by Discretization of Dis-
tributions
Without any loss of generality, we assume that R∈ Lq(Ω,P) and D∈ Lpm(Ω,P) are non-
negative (otherwise we can use the standard decomposition in the positive part and the
negative part). Moreover, we assume that the support, the set of possible outcomes, of
S∈ L∞(Ω,P) is the interval [s,s)⊂ (0,∞). Furthermore, we assume that the probability
measures PR, PS, and PD are continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, so that
according to the theorem of Radon-Nikodym, they have the probability densities ϕR,
ϕS, and ϕDi , i = 1, . . . ,m, respectively. Therefore, for i = 1, . . . ,m, we have
P = PR⊗PS⊗PD,
dPR(r) = ϕR(r)dr,
dPS(s) = ϕS(s)ds
dPDi(ti) = ϕDi(ti)dti.
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Notice that v ∈ Lp(Rd ,P,Rk) means that (r,s, t) 7→ ϕR(r)ϕS(s)ϕD(t)v(r,s, t) belongs to
the Lebesgue space Lp(Rd ,Rk) with respect to the Lebesgue measure where
ϕD(t) := ∏
i
ϕDi(ti).
Therefore, we can define the probabilistic integral variational inequality: Find uˆ :=
uˆ(y) ∈ MP such that for every v ∈ MP, we have
∞∫
0
s∫
s
∫
Rm+
〈sG(uˆ)+H(uˆ),v− uˆ〉ϕR(r)ϕS(s)ϕD(t)dy ≥
∞∫
0
s∫
s
∫
Rm+
〈b+ r c,v− uˆ〉ϕR(r)ϕS(s)ϕD(t)dy .
For numerical approximation of the solution uˆ, we begin with a discretization of the
space X := Lp(Rd ,P,Rk). For this, we introduce a sequence {pin}n of partitions of the
support
ϒ := [0,∞)× [s,s)×Rm+
of the probability measure P induced by the random elements R,S, and D. For this, we
set
pin = (pi
R
n ,pi
S
n ,pi
D
n ),
where
piRn := (r
0
n, . . . ,r
NRn
n ),
piSn := (s
0
n, . . . ,s
NSn
n ),
piDin := (t
0
n,i, . . . , t
NDin
n,i )
0 = r0n < r1n < .. . r
NRn
n = n
s = s0n < s
1
n < .. .s
NSn
n = s
0 = t0n,i < t1n,i < .. . t
NDin
n,i = n (i = 1, . . . ,m)
|piRn | := max{r
j
n − r
j−1
n : j = 1, . . . ,NRn }→ 0 (n → ∞)
|piSn | := max{s
k
n − s
k−1
n : k = 1, . . . ,NSn}→ 0 (n → ∞)
|piDin | := max{t
hi
n,i− t
hi−1
n,i : hi = 1, . . . ,N
Di
n }→ 0 (i = 1, . . . ,m; n → ∞) .
These partitions give rise to the exhausting sequence {ϒn} of subsets of ϒ, where each
ϒn is given by the finite disjoint union of the intervals:
Injkh := [r
j−1
n ,r
j
n)× [s
k−1
n ,s
k
n)× I
n
h ,
where we use the multi-index h = (h1, · · · ,hm) and
Inh := Π
m
i=1 [t
hi−1
n,i , t
hi
n,i).
For each n ∈ N, we consider the space of the Rl-valued step functions (l ∈ N) on ϒn,
extended by 0 outside of ϒn:
X ln := {vn : vn(r,s, t) = ∑
j
∑
k
∑
h
vnjkh1Injkh (r,s, t) ,v
n
jkh ∈ R
l}
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where 1I denotes the {0,1}-valued characteristic function of a subset I.
To approximate an arbitrary function w ∈ Lp(Rd ,P,R), we employ the mean value
truncation operator µn0 associated to the partition pin given by
µn0 w :=
NRn∑
j=1
NSn∑
k=1
∑
h
(µnjkhw)1Injkh , (12)
where
µnjkhw :=


1
P(I jkh)
∫
Injkh
w(y)dP(y) if P(Injkh)> 0;
0 otherwise.
Analogously, for a Lp vector function v = (v1, . . . ,vl), we define
µn0 v := (µn0 v1, . . . ,µn0 vl).
The basic property of the mean value truncation operator is expressed in the following
lemma (see [17]).
Lemma 4.1 For any fixed l ∈N, the linear operator µn0 : Lp(Rd ,P,Rl)→ Lp(Rd ,P,Rl)
is bounded with ‖µn0‖ = 1 and for n → ∞, µn0 converges pointwise in Lp(Rd ,P,Rl) to
the identity.
To construct approximations for
MP = {v ∈ Lp(Rd ,P,Rk) : Av(r,s, t)≤ t , P− a.s.},
we introduce the orthogonal projector q : (r,s, t) ∈ Rd 7→ t ∈ Rm and define for each
elementary cell Injkh,
qnjkh = (µnjkhq) ∈Rm, (µn0 q) = ∑
jkh
qnjkh 1Injkh ∈ X
m
n .
This leads to the following sequence of convex and closed sets of the polyhedral type:
Mn
P
:= {v ∈ X kn : Avnjkh ≤ q
n
jkh , ∀ j,k,h}.
It has been proven (see [17]) that the sequence {Mn
P
} approximate the set MP in the
sense of Mosco ( [25]). In order to to approximate the random variables R and S, we
introduce
ρn =
NRn∑
j=1
r j−1n 1[r j−1n ,r jn) ∈ Xn
σn =
NSn∑
k=1
sk−1n 1[sk−1n ,skn) ∈ Xn,
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where
σn(r,s, t) → σ(r,s, t) = s, in L∞(Rd ,P)
ρn(r,s, t) → ρ(r,s, t) = r, in Lp(Rd ,P).
Combining the above ingredients, for n ∈ N, we consider the following discretized
variational inequality: Find uˆn := uˆn(y) ∈ MnP such that for every vn ∈ MnP, we have
∞∫
0
s∫
s
∫
Rd
〈σn(y)G(uˆn)+H(uˆn),vn − uˆn〉dP(y)≥
∞∫
0
s∫
s
∫
Rd
〈b+ρn(y)c,vn − uˆn〉dP(y) .
(13)
It turns out that (13) can be split in a finite number of finite dimensional variational
inequalities: For every n ∈ N, and for every j,k,h find uˆnjkh ∈ Mnjkh such that
〈 ˜Fnk (uˆ
n
jkh),v
n
jkh− uˆ
n
jkh〉 ≥ 〈c˜
n
j ,v
n
jkh− uˆ
n
jkh〉, for every vnjkh ∈ Mnjkh, (14)
where
Mnjkh := {v
n
jkh ∈ R
k : Avnjkh ≤ q
n
jkh} ,
˜Fnk := s
k−1
n G+H
c˜nj := b+ r j−1n c.
Clearly, we have
uˆn = ∑
j
∑
k
∑
h
uˆnjkh 1Injkh ∈ X
k
n .
Now, we can state the following convergence result (whose proof can be found in [19]).
Theorem 4.1 Assume that F(ω , ·) is strongly monotone uniformly with respect to ω ∈
Ω. Then the sequence uˆn generated by the substitute problems in (13) converges strongly
in Lp(Rd ,P,Rk) for n → ∞ to the unique solution uˆ of (11).
Remark 4.1 Looking carefully at the proof in [19], we can deduce that if the uniform
strong monotonicity hypothesis is not satisfied, and F is only monotone, but we know
that the solution is unique we obtain weak convergence of uˆn to uˆ. This implies conver-
gence of the approximate mean values to the exact mean value of the solution.
5 The stochastic oligopoly model
In this section, we propose a model of oligopolistic market with uncertain data and
show that the theoretical and numerical tools developed in the previous sections can
be successfully applied to the model. The classical oligopolistic market equilibrium
problem is a Nash game with a special structure and it was first introduced by A.
Cournot [10] a long time ago. Recent years have witnessed a renewed interest in
10
oligopoly theory, and many specific cases of oligopolistic markets have been studied in
detail, for instance the electricity market (see e.g. [8, 9], and [5] for a model based on
real industrial data).
We consider here the case in which m players are the producers of the same com-
modity. The quantity produced by firm i is denoted by qi so that q ∈ Rm denotes
the global production vector. Let (Ω,A ,P) be a probability space and for every
i ∈ {1, . . .m} consider functions fi : Ω×R→ R and p : Ω×Rm →R. More precisely,
fi(ω ,qi) represents the cost of producing the commodity for firm i, and is assumed
to be, P− a.s., nonnegative, increasing and C1, while p(ω ,q1 + . . .+ qm) represents
the demand price associated with the commodity. For P−almost every ω ∈ Ω, p is
assumed nonnegative, increasing and C1. The resulting welfare function wi is assumed
to be concave with respect to qi. We also assume that all these functions are random
variables w.r.t. ω , i.e. they are measurable with respect to the probability measure P on
Ω. In this way, we cover the possibility that both the production cost and the demand
price are affected by a certain degree of uncertainty, or randomness. Thus, the welfare
(or utility) function of player i, representing the net revenue, is given by:
wi(ω ,q1, . . . ,qm) = p(ω ,q1 + . . .+ qm)qi− fi(ω ,qi). (15)
Although many models assume no bounds on the production, in a more realistic
model the production capability is bounded from above and we also allow these upper
bounds to be random variables: 0 ≤ qi ≤ qi(ω). Thus, the specific Nash equilibrium
problem associated with this model takes the following form:
For P− a.e. ω ∈ Ω, find q∗(ω) = (q∗1(ω), . . . ,q∗m(ω)):
wi(ω ,q∗(ω)) = max
0≤qi≤qi(ω)
{p(ω ,qi+∑
j 6=i
q∗j(ω))qi, − fi(ω ,qi)}, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. (16)
In order to write the equivalent variational inequality, consider,∀ω , a closed and convex
subset of Rm:
K(ω) = {(q1, . . . ,qm) : 0 ≤ qi ≤ qi(ω), ∀i}
and define the functions
Fi(ω ,q) :=
∂ fi(ω ,qi)
∂qi
−
∂ p(ω ,∑mj=1 q j)
∂qi
qi− p(ω ,
m
∑
j=1
q j) (17)
= f ′i (ω ,qi)− p′(ω ,Q)qi− p(ω ,Q), (Q =
m
∑
j=1
q j).
The Nash problem is then equivalent to the following variational inequality: for P−a.e.
ω ∈ Ω, find q∗(ω) ∈ K(ω) such that
m
∑
i=1
[
∂ fi(ω ,q∗i (ω))
∂qi
−
∂ p(ω ,∑mj=1 q∗j(ω))
∂qi
qi− p(ω ,
m
∑
j=1
q∗j(ω))
]
(qi− q∗i (ω))≥ 0
(18)
∀q ∈ K(ω).
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Remark 5.1 Since F(ω , ·) is continuous, and K(ω) is convex and compact, problem
(18) is solvable for almost every ω ∈ Ω, due to the Stampacchia’s theorem. In the case
that the production capability is assumed unbounded some additional hypotheses (i.e.
coercivity, see e.g. [24]) have to be present to ensure the solvability of (18).
Moreover, we assume that F(ω , ·) is monotone, i.e.:
m
∑
i=1
(Fi(ω ,q)−Fi(ω ,q′))(qi− q′i)≥ 0 ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀q,q′ ∈ Rm.
(recall that F is said to be strictly monotone if the equality holds only for q = q′ and
in this case (18) has a unique solution). It is noteworthy that some classes of utility
functions widely used in the economic literature enjoy some form of monotonicity (see
section 6).
Now we are interested in computing statistical quantities associated with the so-
lution q∗(ω), in particular its mean value. For this purpose, in accordance with the
general scheme of Section 2, we consider a Lebesgue space formulation of problems
(18): Find u∗ ∈ K such that
∫
Ω
m
∑
i=1
[
∂ fi(ω ,u∗i (ω))
∂qi
−
∂ p(ω ,∑mj=1 u∗j(ω))
∂qi
ui− p(ω ,
m
∑
j=1
u∗j(ω))
]
×
(ui(ω)− u
∗
i (ω))dPω ≥ 0 , (19)
where
K = {u ∈ Lp(Ω,P,Rm) : 0 ≤ ui(ω)≤ qi(ω)}, qi ∈ Lp(ω ,P).
Since the stochastic oligopolistic market problem will be studied through (19), we
ensure its solvability by the following theorem:
Theorem 5.1 Let fi(·,qi), p(·,∑mj=1 q j) be measurable, and fi(ω , ·),di(ω , ·) be of class
C1. Let F be strictly monotone and satisfy the growth condition d) of Section 2. Then
(19) admits a unique solution.
Proof. Under our assumptions, F : Ω×Rm → Rm is a Carathe´odory function and
it is well known that for each measurable function u(ω), the function F(ω ,u(ω)) is
also measurable. Under the growth condition d) the superposition operator ˆF : u(ω)→
F(ω ,u(ω)) maps Lp(Ω,P,Rm) in Lp′(Ω,P,Rm) and is continuous, being P a proba-
bility measure. Moreover, the uniform strong monotonicity of F implies the strong
monotonicity of ˆF . The set KP is convex, closed and (norm) bounded, hence weakly
compact. Then, monotone operator theory applies and (19) admits a unique solution
(see e.g. [24] for a recent survey on existence theorems which also includes the case of
unbounded sets). 
Now, in view of the numerical approximation of the solution, we further specialize our
model and assume that the random and the deterministic part of the operator can be
separated. Thus, we assume that the price can be affected by two random perturbations
α(ω) and S(ω) such that:
p(ω ,Q) = S(ω)p(Q)+α(ω),
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while the cost functions are of the type:
fi(ω ,qi) = βi(ω) fi(qi)+ gi(qi),
that is, the cost functions consists of a deterministic term gi and a term, (still denoted
by fi with an abuse of notation), which is modulated by the random perturbation βi.
Here α,βi are real random variables, with 0 < s ≤ S(ω)≤ s , 0 < β i ≤ βi(ω)≤ β i.
As a consequence, the operator F takes the form:
Fi(ω ,q) = βi(ω)∂ fi(qi)∂qi +
∂gi(qi)
∂qi
− S(ω)p(
m
∑
j=1
q j)−α(ω)− S(ω)
∂ p(∑mj=1 q j)
∂qi
qi.
Furthermore, we assume that F is uniformly strongly monotone, wi(ω ,0)∈ L1(Ω), and
the growth condition d) of Section 2 is satisfied.
Now, according to the methodology explained in Section 3, we will work with
the probability distributions induced on the images of the functions: A = α(ω),s =
S(ω),Bi = βi(ω),Qi = qi(ω). Thus, let y = (A,s,B,Q) and consider the probability
space (Rd ,B,P) with d = 2+2m, where B is the Borel sigma-algebra on Rd . In order
to formulate our problem in the image space, we introduce the closed convex set KP
by:
KP = {u ∈ L2(Rd ,P,Rm) : 0 ≤ ui(A,s,B,Q) ≤ Qi,∀i,P− a.s.} .
We assume that all the random variables are independent and that each probability
distribution is characterized by its density ϕ . Thus, we have P = PA ⊗ Ps ⊗ PB ⊗
PQ, dPα(A) = ϕα(A)dA, dPS(s) = ϕS(s)ds, dPβ (B) = ϕβ (B)dB, dPq(Q) = ϕq(Q)dQ,
where we used the compact notation ϕx(X)=
n
∏
i=1
ϕxi(Xi). Thus, we obtain the following
problem: Find u∗ ∈ KP such that ∀u ∈ KP
s∫
s
β∫
β
∫
R+
∫
R
m
+
m
∑
i=1
[
Bi
∂ fi(u∗i (A,s,B,Q))
∂qi
+
∂gi(u∗i (A,s,B,Q))
∂qi
− p
(
m
∑
j=1
u∗j(A,s,B,Q)
)
−A−
∂ p(∑mj=1 u∗j(A,s,B,Q))
∂qi
u∗i (A,s,B,Q)
]
×
(ui(A,B,Q)− u∗i (A,s,B,Q))ϕα (A)ϕS(s)ϕβ (B)ϕq(Q) dsdAdBdQ ≥ 0, (20)
where the symbol
β∫
β
represents the m integrals
β i∫
β i
. This formulation is suitable for the
approximation procedure based on discretization and truncation explained in Section 4.
6 A class of utility functions and numerical examples
In this section we consider a modified and random version of a class of utility functions
introduced by Murphy, Sheraly and Soyster in [23] and successively used by other
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scholars. These functions generate a nonlinear monotone variational inequality on a
certain Lp space, where p is determined by the power law of the cost functions. The
cost and demand price functions for the five-firm case in [23] are given by:
fi(qi) = ciqi + bibi + 1k
−1/bi
i q
bi+1
bi
i , i = 1, . . . ,5
p(Q) = 50001/1.1Q−1/1.1, Q =
5
∑
i=1
qi.
The values of the parameters ci,ki,bi in [23] alongwith our upper bounds for the qi are
given Table 1. An approximate solution of the problem obtained by a projection method
is given in [26] as (q1,q2,q3,q4,q5) = (36.937,41.817,43.706,42.659,39.179).
Table 1: Parameter values for the numerical example
i 1 2 3 4 5
ci 10 8 6 4 2
ki 5 5 5 5 5
bi 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8
qi 100 100 100 100 100
Before introducing random parameters in the above functions we note that the de-
mand price becomes unbounded when the total quantity Q approaches 0 (commodity is
scarce). Although the solution Q∗ = 0 is never met in most examples, in order to deal
with a well behaved function we consider the functional form:
p(Q) = 50001/1.1(Q+ e)−1/1.1,
where e is a small positive parameter which determines the maximum price the con-
sumer can pay when the commodity is very scarce. In our model, we add a random
perturbation r(ω) to ci, and we modulate the price function by a random function S(ω).
Thus, for the general case of m firms, we introduce cost functions given by:
fi(ω ,qi) = [ci + r(ω)]qi + bibi + 1k
−1/bi
i q
bi+1
bi
i , (21)
where bi,ci,ki are positive parameters, and demand price functions:
p(ω ,Q) = [S(ω)]a 1
(Q+ e)a , (22)
where 0 < s < S(ω)< s, and a is a parameter such that 0 < a < 1 ( a = 1/1.1 in [23]).
With these functions we can build the Carathe´odory function F which defines the
variational inequality through:
Fi(ω ,q) = ci+r(ω)+k−1/bii q
1/bi
i +a[S(ω)]
a qi
(Q+ e)a+1
−
[S(ω)]a
(Q+ e)a , i = 1 . . .m. (23)
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We also use the notation Fi(ω ,q) = Gi(ω ,q)+Hi(ω ,q), where Gi represents the sum
of the first three terms in (23), while Hi is the rest of the sum, which contains the price
function. The monotonicity of F is analyzed in the following:
Theorem 6.1 The function F(ω , ·) defined by (23) is strictly monotone in Rm+, for all
ω ∈ Ω and for all fixed values of the parameters therein.
Proof. Let us observe that the functions k−1/bii q
1/bi
i are strictly increasing for all i,
hence the operator G(ω , ·) is strictly monotone on Rn+, for all ω .
In order to study the monotonicity properties of H, we preliminary notice that the
function p : Ω×R → R defined in (22) has strictly positive second derivative (w.r.t.
Q):
p′′(ω ,Q) = a(a+ 1)[S(ω)]
a
(Q+ e)a+2,
(recall that 0 < s ≤ S(ω)), therefore p(ω , ·) is strictly convex for all Q ≥ 0.
Let us now consider the function Q p(ω ,Q) = [S(ω)]a Q
(Q+ e)a which is strictly con-
cave on Rn+, for each value of ω , with second derivative given by:
[Qp(ω ,Q)]′′ = [S(ω)]a a(a− 1)Q− 2ae
(Q+ e)a+2 < 0
(0 < a < 1). Hence, we get:
− 2p′(ω ,Q)> Qp′′(ω ,Q) (24)
which will be exploited in the sequel.
To prove the strict monotonicity of H(ω , ·) for all ω we compute its Jacobian matrix:
Ji j(ω ,Q) = −p′(ω ,Q)− qip′′(ω ,Q), if i 6= j
Jii(ω ,Q) = −2p′(ω ,Q)− qip′′(ω ,Q).
It is useful to decompose J as follows:
J(ω ,Q) =−p′(ω ,Q)1− p′(ω ,Q)I− p′′(ω ,Q)(qi)i j ,
where 1 denotes the m×m matrix with each entry equal to 1, I is the identity matrix
and the matrix (qi)i j has each entry of the row i equal to qi. We prove that J(ω ,Q) is
positive definite for all ω and for all Q ≥ 0 by studying the quadratic form
T (ω ,Q)(h) = hT J(ω ,Q)h, h ∈ Rm.
From the decomposition of the J(ω ,Q) we then get:
T (ω ,Q)(h) = −p′(ω ,Q)
(
m
∑
i, j=1
(1)i jhih j +
m
∑
i, j=1
(I)i jhih j
)
− p′′(ω ,Q)
m
∑
i, j=1
(qi)i jhih j
= −

p′(ω ,Q)


(
m
∑
j=1
h j
)2
+ ‖h‖2

+ p′′(ω ,Q)
(
m
∑
j=1
h j
)(
m
∑
j=1
q jh j
)
 .
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Now, if h 6= (0, . . . ,0), from (24) we get the strict inequality:
2T (ω ,Q)(h)> p′′(ω ,Q)

Q

‖h‖2 +
(
m
∑
j=1
h j
)2− 2
(
m
∑
j=1
h j
)(
m
∑
j=1
q jh j
)
 .
Given that p(ω , ·) has strictly positive second derivative, it suffices to prove that the
quantity in curly brackets is nonnegative.
Thus, let h ∈Rm with ∑mj=1 h j ≥ 0 (the case where ∑mj=1 h j ≤ 0 can be analyzed along
the same lines), so that:(
m
∑
j=1
h j
)(
m
∑
j=1
q jh j
)
≤ h jmax
(
m
∑
j=1
h j
)(
m
∑
j=1
q j
)
≤ Qh jmax
(
m
∑
j=1
h j
)
,
where h jmax is and index such that hmax ≥ h j, ∀ j = 1 . . .m and without loss of generality
we can assume jmax = m in the sequel. We get then:
2T (ω ,Q)(h) > Q p′′(ω ,Q)



‖h‖2 +
(
m
∑
j=1
h j
)2− 2hm m∑
j=1
h j


= Qp′′(ω ,Q)

m−1∑
j=1
h2j + h2m+
(
m−1
∑
j=1
h j + hm
)2
− 2hm
m
∑
j=1
h j


= Qp′′(ω ,Q)

m−1∑
j=1
h2j +
(
m−1
∑
j=1
h j
)2≥ 0.
Thus, T (ω ,Q)(h)> 0,∀ω ∈ Ω,∀Q ∈ Rm+, ∀h 6= (0, . . . ,0). 
Now, let us consider the case m = 5 with the data as in Table 1. The function F , defines
a Nemitsky operator between Lebesgue spaces, as explained in the previous sections.
To be precise, since the exponents bi in the cost functions vary from 0.8 to 1.2, we
select p = 1+ 1/0.8 so that the Nemitsky operator associated to F maps functions
u ∈ L9/4 into u ∈ L9/5. Moreover, we let random parameters r(ω) and S(ω) to have
truncated normal distributions as follows:
r ∼ −0.5 ≤ N(0,0.25)≤ 0.5
s ∼ 4950≤ N(5000,10)≤ 5050
while fixing parameter e at 0.0001. Mean values E(u) of u(r,s) = (u1,u2,u3,u4,u5) ob-
tained by numerical approximations are presented in Table 2 where nr and ns stand for
number of discretization points for intervals [−0.5,0.5] and [4950,5050] respectively.
7 Conclusions
In this article we considered Nash equilibrium problems in Lebesgue spaces with prob-
ability measure and derived their equivalent variational inequality formulation. As a
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Table 2: Mean values of ui, i=1,. . . ,5
E(u1) E(u2) E(u3) E(u4) E(u5)
(nr,ns) = (200,20000) 36.8855 41.7615 43.6448 42.5972 39.121
(nr,ns) = (400,40000) 36.913 41.7928 43.6776 42.6294 39.1506
specific application, we proposed a model of oligopolistic market with uncertain data
to which the recent theory of random variational inequality ( [17, 19]) was applied.
We also illustrated our model and the approximation procedure by means of a class of
utility functions which yield to nonlinear monotone random variational inequalities.
Further developments of our approach can be done in several directions: other
type of probabilistic constraints could be considered instead of the “robust” pointwise
constraints (see e.g. [12]); an extension of our numerical method, for example through
parallelization, is desirable and would permit the treatement of problems with a larger
number of independent random variables; at last, the theory and computation of the
stochastic Lagrange multipliers associated to SNEPs in Lebesgue spaces is a topic that
has been adressed only recently ( [20]) in a simplified model and only from a theoretical
point of view.
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